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ARTICLES

BASIC JUSTICIABIUTY ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Justiciability is a standard preliminary requirement in
constitutional cases' and nonconstitutional cases as well. If
claimant fails to survive the gauntlet of justiciability requirements, the claim should be dismissed without reaching the
merits. Judges are usually experts on justiciability rules, since
they must apply them in all cases. Attorneys, in contrast, are
often not prepared to deal with justiciability issues and
should pay much more attention to these crucial requirements.
Justiciability rules are often applied in an unprincipled,
ad hoc, result-oriented manner. If the Justices want to reach
the merits of an issue, they apply justiciability requirements
loosely and overlook facts that might ordinarily lead to dismissal. If the Justices want to duck a case without reaching
the merits, they tighten up the justiciability requirements.
Consequently, the cases are not reconcilable, and any attempt
to synthesize the Court's decisions is doomed, but it is possible at least to analyze justiciability issues in an orderly way.
This article describes the structure of justiciability analysis as set forth in United States Supreme Court cases. The
purpose is to help law students and lawyers understand and
apply the several strands of Supreme Court law in this important, but often confusing field.
Justiciability law involves a constellation of related rules.2

© 1990 by Russell W. Galloway.
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member of
the California bar.
1. See Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 775
(1988).
2. Some commentators have asked whether the rules might be "merely illus-
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There is no generally accepted outline of justiciability rules,
but one that seems convenient and complete focuses separately on "the who, when and what of constitutional adjudication."' The following outline summarizes the basic principles
of justiciability law based on this three-part analysis.
Justiciability: Basic Analysis
A. The What
1. The actual case requirement
a. The adversity requirement and the rule against
collusive cases
b. The rule against advisory opinions
2. The justiciable issue requirement
a. The political question doctrine
b. The rule against extra-judicial review
B. The When
1. Ripeness
2. Mootness
3. The rule of necessity
C. The Who (Standing)
1. General standing
2. Taxpayer standing
3. Organizational standing
This article will not discuss the cases in detail or go into
the subtleties of justiciability analysis. Instead, it will merely
describe in a general way the rules that the Court has announced and that should normally be used to structure analysis, briefs, and court opinions.4

trations of a single underlying institutional policy." G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 1534 (11th ed. 1985) [This article will repeatedly cite Professor Gunther's
leading casebook on constitutional law; all references will be to the most recent
(eleventh) edition published in 1985.] Cf Rescue Army v. Muncipal Court, 331
U.S. 549 (1947), in which Justice Rutledge treated many justiciability rules as
applications of "a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues."
Id. at 568. But the Supreme Court treats the rules as separate requirements, and
it is probably best for law students and lawyers to do so as well.
3. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1532; cf. J. BARRON & C. DIENES,
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

IN

A

NUTSHELL

23-44 (1986);

Monaghan,

Constitutional

Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973).
4. State courts are not bound by federal justiciability requirements. If a state
court decision comes before a federal court for review, however, the federal court
must dismiss if federal justiciability requirements are not met. E.g., Doremus v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1043).
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II.

A.

DISCUSSION

The What of ConstitutionalLitigation

Justiciability requirements apply, first, to the subject matter of the constitutional claim. The claim must arise in the
context of an actual "case or controversy" between adverse
parties, and the constitutional issue must itself be justiciable.
1.

The Actual Case Requirement

The "judicial Power" vested in the federal courts by article III of the United States Constitution extends only to nine
categories of "Cases" and "Controversies." As the Supreme
Court has put it, "By cases and controversies are intended
the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law
or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or
the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs."5
a. The Adversity Requirement and the Rule Against
Collusive Cases
Federal courts are only permitted to decide actual disputes between parties whose interests are adverse. "[C]onstitutional issues ...
will not be determined in friendly,
nonadversary proceedings ....
"6 Put another way, "The
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests ....
It
must be a real and substantial controversy . . . ."' Like other
justiciability rules, this rule has not always been applied rigorously; many famous Supreme Court cases have been
feigned.8
b.

The Rule Against Advisory Opinions

"[T]he most prominent, most continuously articulated
boundary of justiciability .. . [is that] federal courts will not

5. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).
6. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 569.
7. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
8. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171 (1796).
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9
give 'advisory opinions."' The rule goes back at least to
1793, when the Justices of the Supreme Court declined a
request from President Washington and Secretary of State
Jefferson to answer a series of abstract questions concerning
America's role as a neutral toward a war between England
and France. "Ever since, it has been accepted that federal
courts cannot give advisory opinions.""
A corollary of the rule against advisory opinions is the
rule that federal courts should not decide federal issues in a
case whose outcome is determined by an independent and
adequate state ground." In such cases, the decision on the
federal issue would not affect the outcome and would therefore be purely advisory. "We are not permitted to render an
advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an
advisory opinion."1 2

2.

The Justiciable Issue Requirement

To be justiciable, a constitutional claim must not only
arise in the context of an actual case but the specific issue
must also be justiciable. To be justiciable, the issue must not
be a political question and the court's decision on the issue
must not be subject to extrajudicial review.
a.

The Political Question Doctrine

"[T]he concept that some constitutional issues are
nonjusticiable because they are 'political' is well established . . . ."" "Political" is a word of art in this context; it
does not refer to "politics," but to a collection of rules which
in his landmark majority opinJustice Brennan summarized
14
Carr.
v.
Baker
in
ion

9. G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1535.
10. G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1536.
11. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
12. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
13. G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1608.
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Justice Brennan wrote:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of

1990]
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The discussion in this article follows Professor Gunther's
three-part analysis of the political question doctrine:
There are at least three strands to the "political question" doctrine. The first, most confined, most clearly
legitimate one is the "constitutional commitment"
strand .

. .

. "[The second] strand of the political ques-

tions doctrine finds some issues nonjusticiable because
they cannot be resolved by judicially manageable standards,' or on the basis of data available to the courts.
Still another, even more open-ended strand of the doctrine, suggests that the political questions notion is essentially a problem of judicial discretion, of prudential judgments that some issues ought not to be decided by the
courts because they are too controversial or could produce enforcement problems or other institutional difficulties."' 5
1) Demonstrable Textual Commitment
An issue is a nonjusticiable political question if the text
of the Constitution demonstrably commits the resolution of
6
the issue to another branch of the federal government.
Coleman v. Miller 7 is often viewed as a classic application of
this rule, although the commitment to Congress of the issue
whether constitutional amendments have been properly ratified is not all that textually demonstrable. Powell v.
McCormack,"8 which held that decisions concerning exclusion
of duly elected persons from membership in the House of
Representatives are not demonstrably committed to the
House, suggests that not much is left of this strand other
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for

nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id. at 217, quoted with approval in the United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct.
1964, 1968 (1990).
15. G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1608-09.
16. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, which refers to "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."
17. 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (ratification of proposed Child Labor Amendment is
a political question).
18. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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than perhaps decisions concerning impeachments and certain
minor, in-house legislative and executive matters.
2)

Not Apt for Judicial Resolution

The Court will deem an issue to be a nonjusticiable
political question if the courts are unable to decide it because of "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it.""9 The same may be true if the
courts' evidentiary procedures do not provide sufficient information to permit sound judgment on the issue. As the Court
put it in Coleman v. Miller,"
Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? ... In short, the question of a reasonable time [for ratifying proposed constitutional
amendments] in many cases would involve, as in this case
it does involve, an appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic, which can
hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of
evidence receivable in a court of justice .. 2
The question of malapportionment of legislative districts
22
was long considered not apt for judicial resolution. Baker
v. Carr, the landmark decision holding claims of legislative
malapportionment to be justiciable stressed, "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed
,,3 Luther v. Borden,24 the landmark case
and familiar . *...
holding that the guaranty clause 25 is nonjusticiable, also
stressed "the lack of criteria by which a court could determine which form of government was republican. "26
3)

Too Hot To Handle

The last and most controversial strand of the political
question doctrine is based on the concept that courts should
duck issues if deciding them will cause too much harm to

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Id. at 453-54.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 222.
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the judiciary. This "prudential" strand is illustrated by the
Court's refusal to decide the constitutionality of the Vietnam
War despite several opportunities to do so. As Justice Frankfurter put it in his Colegrove opinion declining to reach the
merits of legislative reapportionment, "Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket."2 7
b.

The Rule Against Extra-judicial Review

From its earliest days, the Supreme Court has held "that
it was essential to judicial decisions that they be final rather
than tentative, and not subject to revision by the executive
and legislative branches."2 8 In other words, if the court's
decision in a case is subject to extrajudicial review, the case
should be dismissed for lack of justiciability.
An early illustration of this rule is Hayburn's Case,29 in
which the Justices refused to decide veterans' pension claims
because the decisions would have been subject to reversal by
the Secretary of War. The Court confirmed the rule in Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp.,3" which stated:
Judgments within the powers vested in courts ...

may

not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and
credit by another Department of Government.
* It has also been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not
binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are
subject to later review or alteration by administrative
action."
This completes the discussion of rules concerning the
"what" of constitutional litigation. The next section discusses
the "when."
B.

The When of ConstitutionalLitigation

Requirements concerning when constitutional issues
should be decided on the merits include ripeness, mootness,
and the rule of necessity.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1536.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
333 U.S. 103 (1948).
Id. at 113-14.
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1. Ripeness
Courts should adjudicate only constitutional claims that
are ripe.3 2 The question here is "whether the harm asserted
3
has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention."
There is no analytical "test" for determining when a claim is
ripe. The Justices simply inquire whether sufficient contingencies remain concerning the conduct of either the claimant or
the respondent so as to negate the conclusion that the dispute has become real and concrete.
34
In United Public Workers v. Michell, for example, all
but one of the federal employees seeking to challenge the
Hatch Act had unripe claims because they had not yet engaged in political activities barred by the Act; the Court dismissed the claims, refusing to speculate about possible future
acts. Similarly, one of the home builders associations in
Warth" did not present a ripe controversy because it did
not have any application for a specific project currently
pending before the Penfield zoning board.
2.

Mootness

As a general rule, moot claims are not justiciable and
should be dismissed. However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions.

32. The ripeness requirement overlaps substantially with the rule against advisory opinions.
33. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975). Warth is a landmark case
that raises many justiciability issues and will be cited repeatedly in this article. The
case involved a claim by numerous plaintiffs - including indigent and minority
individuals, taxpayers, community action groups, building contractors, and home
builders associations - that Penfield, New York's restrictive zoning ordinance violated the equal protection rights of indigents and racial minorities by preventing
the construction of low-income housing in the town and therefore preventing
plaintiffs from living there. In a 5-4 decision, the Burger Court invoked standing,
ripeness, and mootness doctrines and threw out all claims without reaching the
merits. Warth classically illustrates the Burger Court's strict attitude toward justiciability requirements.
34. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

35. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).

BASIC JUSTICIABILITY

1990]

a.

The General Rule

The general rule is that courts should adjudicate only
constitutional claims that are not moot. 6 This is a constitutional requirement stemming from the article III restriction
of judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." The question
here is "whether the occasion for judicial intervention persists."" Again, there is no specific analytical test for determining when a dispute has become moot. The Justices simply
inquire whether facts have occurred that resolved the dispute
and eliminated the need for a judicial determination.
Here are some examples. In Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 8 a challenge to Missouri's statutory ban on
use of public funds for abortion counseling was dismissed as
moot after Missouri conceded that the rule did not apply to
claimants. The law school affirmative action case, DeFunis v.
3 9 was
Odegaard,
dismissed as moot, because DeFunis was already in his final quarter at another law school. One of the
home builders associations in Warth presented a moot controversy because it did not allege that its proposal to build
homes in Penfield "remained viable."4" And a claim that the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies in a liquor license revocation proceeding was dismissed as moot, because
the applicant for the liquor license had gone out of busi41
ness.
b.

Exceptions

Exceptions to the mootness requirement include claims
"capable of repetition, yet evading review," claims by a certified class representative, and claims mooted by respondent's
voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct.

36. If a claim becomes moot at any stage of the controversy, whether in the
trial court or on appeal, the lawyers have a duty to advise the court promptly.
E.g., Board of License Comin'rs v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238 (1985).
37. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10.

38. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
39. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
40.

Board of License Comm'rs, 469 U.S. 238 (1985).

41. Wailh, 422 U.S. at 517.
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1) Claims Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review
A claimant whose own claim has become moot is permitted to adjudicate the claim if it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review."42 A classic example of this exception is Roe
v. Wade,43 the landmark abortion case. The problem was
that pregnancy lasts only nine months, too short a period to
allow a constitutional challenge to reach the Supreme Court.
Holding that the claim remained justiciable despite the end
of the pregnancy, the Court stated:
[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the
litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is
so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the
usual appellate process is complete. If that termination
makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review
Pregnancy provides a
will be effectively denied ....
of nonmootness. It
a
conclusion
for
classic justification
yet evading rerepetition,
truly could be "capable of
44
view."
Apparently, the claim must be capable of repetition
vis-a-vis the particular claimant. Thus, the Court has indicated
that a case is not moot when "(1) for the particular claimant
the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there
was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
45
would be subjected to the same action again."

2)

Claims of Class Representatives

An individual whose claim has become moot may be

permitted to adjudicate the claim when he or she has been
certified as a representative of a class of claimants.4 6 As the

42. "The 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception stems from
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911)." G. GUNTHER, supia
note 2, at 1579.
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Id. at 125.
45. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (emphasis added).
46. E.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972). "[M]ootness challenges have been rejected in a number of cases
even though the plaintiff's controversy was no longer live, because the litigant had
sued on behalf of a class." G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1579.

1990]
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Court put it, "[A]n action brought on behalf of a class does
not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's
substantive claim .... "47
3)

Voluntary Cessation by Respondent

Claims for injunctive relief are not automatically subject
to dismissal merely because respondent has stopped committing the conduct giving rise to the claim. Injunctions were
traditionally considered appropriate in such cases, in part
because of the danger that respondent would resume the
conduct after dismissal of the case. The current Court may
be shifting toward the view that injunction actions should be
dismissed after voluntary cessation unless claimant can show
a likelihood of future recurrence.48
3.

The Rule of Necessity

Courts should not decide constitutional issues in advance
of the necessity of doing so. "If there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality ...

unless

such

adjudication

is

unavoid-

able."49 Thus, for example, if an alternative statutory basis
for the decision exists, the court should not reach the constitutional issue. Similarly, courts should seek a reasonable "saving interpretation" of a statute in order to avoid deciding
constitutional questions.5 °
This completes the discussion of the "when" of constitutional litigation. The next section discusses the "who."
C.

The Who of Constitutional Litigation

Courts will not reach the merits of constitutional issues
unless claimant is a proper party to present the claim. Here
the main questions concern standing. "The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party .

.

. and not

47. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).
48. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 3, at 37.
49. Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
50. E.g., Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989); Ashwander v. TVA,

297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." 5 "[T]he gist
of the question of standing" is whether the litigant alleges
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
2
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."5
Standing rules may be divided into three categories:
general rules of standing, rules concerning taxpayer standing,
and rules concerning organizational standing.
1. General Rules of Standing
In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the general rules of standing involve both
constitutional and prudential components. As the Court put
it in the leading case, Warth v. Seldin,55 "In essence the
question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves both- constitutional limitations
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
on federal-court
54
exercise."
a.

Constitutional Requirements

The Constitution requires that claimant has suffered an
"injury in fact" that was caused by the allegedly unconstitutional government action and that will be redressed by the
relief requested. These requirements are constitutional55minima that may not be waived by Congress or the courts.

1) Injury in Fact
Article III requires that claimant have suffered "injury in

51.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).

52.
53.
54.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at 498.

55.

"[Alt an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the

court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' . . .
and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision.'" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
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fact,"5" i.e, "actual or threatened injury. " " A phrase commonly used to describe this requirement is "a distinct and
palpable injury.""
Such actual injury need not be physical or economic. It
may involve environmental and aesthetic consequences such
as thermal pollution of lakes in the vicinity" and elimination of wilderness lands.6" Indeed, the injury in fact "may
exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing ....
2)

Nexus

In order to satisfy constitutional standing requirements,
claimant must "allege a sufficient nexus between her injury
and the government action which she attacks .

. . . "2

This

requirement that there be a nexus between the precise government action alleged to be unconstitutional and the precise
harm of which claimant complains has two components, a
causation requirement and a redressability requirement.
a)

The Causation Requirement

To satisfy the nexus requirement, claimant must show
that his or her injury-in-fact was caused by the precise action
claimed to be unconstitutional. As Chief Justice Burger put it
in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, Inc.,63 plaintiff must show "a 'fairly traceable' causal connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."64 The test
is whether claimant shows a "substantial probability" that the
challenged action caused the alleged harm.65 The fact that
the harm is caused indirectly through the intervening act of
a third-party does not necessary negate standing, "[b]ut it

56. Id. ("The exercise of judicial power . . . is therefore restricted to litigants
who can show 'injury in fact' . . ...

57. Id. at 500.
58. Id. at 501.
59. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).

60. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
61. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1972).
62. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617-18.

63. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
64.

Id. at 72.

65.

Wan/h, 422 U.S. at 504.

924
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may make it substantially more difficult to meet ...

[the

standing requirement].""
Here are some examples. In Linda R.S.," claimant
lacked standing to challenge the government's failure to enforce child support duties because she could not show that
the father's failure to pay was caused by the government's
failure to enforce. In Warth,6" the individual claimants
lacked standing because they could not show that defendants'
refusal to rezone, rather than claimants' own poverty, was
the cause of their inability to reside in Penfield. In Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,69 claimants who sought
to compel the IRS to deny favorable tax treatment to hospitals that failed to provide free medical services to indigents
did not have standing because "[i]t is purely speculative
whether the denials of service specified in the complaint
fairly can be traced to .

.

. [IRS] 'encouragement' or instead

result from decisions 70made by the hospitals without regard to
the tax implications."
In contrast, claimants seeking to overthrow the $560
million statutory ceiling on damage claims arising from a
single nuclear accident had standing because "there is a substantial likelihood that Duke [Power Co.] would not be able
to complete the construction and maintain the operation
of ... [the nuclear plants here] but
for the protection pro71
vided by the Price- Anderson Act."
b)

The Redressability Requirement

To satisfy the nexus requirement, claimant must also
allege that the relief requested will effectively remedy the
harm that allegedly resulted from the claimed constitutional
violation. As the Court put it in Simon, 2 plaintiff must
show "an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."" Again, the test is whether claimant

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 505.
410 U.S. 614 (1972).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
Id. at 42-43.

71.

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978).

72. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
73. Id. at 38.
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shows a "substantial probability"
that the relief requested
74
"will remove the harm."

Here are some examples. In Linda R.S.,75 claimant
lacked standing because she could not show that the relief
requested, initiation of child support enforcement proceedings against the father of her child, would eliminate her injury by producing support payments. Since the father might
choose to go to jail instead, it could "at best, be termed only
speculative" whether the injury would be redressed.76 In
Warth,7 individual claimants lacked standing because they
failed to show that they could have afforded to live in the
housing projects they sought to have built. In Simon, 7
claimants lacked standing because the relief requested, an
order requiring the IRS to deny tax benefits to hospitals not
providing free services to indigents, would not assure that
the desired medical services would be offered. The hospitals
might choose to forego the favorable tax treatment and continue refusing to serve indigents.
b.

PrudentialRequirements

The Supreme Court has also required that claimant's
injury be "more than a generalized grievance" and that claimant assert his or her own constitutional rights rather than the
rights of a third party. These requirements are not constitutional. They are Court-created and may be waived by Congress or the Court.
1) More Than a Generalized Grievance
If the sole harm of which a party complains is a "generalized grievance" shared by all or many others, standing is
barred by the first of the Court's prudential rules. "[W]hen
the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in sub-

74. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975). As the Court put it in
Simon, "Moreover, the complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in
this suit would result in respondents' receiving the hospital treatment they desire."

426 U.S. at 45-46. In Duke Power Co., the Court said, "[A] litigant must demonstrate . . . a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury . . . ." 438 U.S. at 79.
75. 410 U.S. 614 (1972).

76. Id. at 618.
77.
78.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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stantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens,
that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction."79
Here are some examples. A citizen's interest in preventing the erroneous execution of a death row inmate is too
generalized to provide standing for a cruel and unusual punishment claim."0 Similarly, the general interest in constitutional governance is insufficient to provide citizens with
standing to raise an incompatibility clause" challenge
against simultaneous membership in the military reserves and
the House of Representatives. 2 For the same reason, federal taxpayers normally do not have standing to challenge federal expenditures.8 " Nor do such taxpayers have standing to
challenge the federal government's failure to publish information concerning CIA expenditures. 4 In all these cases,
claimants' interest was too generalized to provide standing.
The Rule Against Vicarious Standing

2)

The second prudential standing rule is that parties must
assert their own constitutional rights and may not assert the
constitutional rights of third parties. However, this general
rule is subject to some exceptions.8 5
a)

The General Rule: No Vicarious Standing

The general rule is that vicarious standing is not permitted. "[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal

79. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. The rule against "generalized grievances" is similar to the "injury in fact" requirement. It is often difficult to determine the
boundaries between these two rules and why the Court invokes one rather than
the other.
80. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
81. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, which provides, "no Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his continuance in Office."
82. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
83. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); see infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
84. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
85. "The general rule, as frequently stated by the Court, is that 'one may
not claim standing [to] vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party'; but
'the Court has created numerous exceptions which lack a coherent pattern and
leave the significance of the rule in doubt.'" G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1574.
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rights or interests of third parties. " " Thus, for example, the
Rochester taxpayers in Warths1 7 lacked standing, because
they were attempting to assert the constitutional rights of
other persons with regard to housing in Penfield.
b)

The Exceptions
(1)

Special Factors

In numerous cases, the Court has allowed parties to assert the rights of others not before the Court based on the
presence of one or more of three special factors. Professor
Gunther's summary is helpful:
[T]he Court has identified three factors as important in
justifying the wide-ranging exceptions to the barrier
against raising the rights of third parties: "the presence
of some substantial relationship between the claimant,
and the third parties"; the impossibility of the third party
rightholders "asserting their own constitutional rights";
and "the risk that the rights of third parties will be diluted" unless the party is allowed to assert their rights.'M
Barrows v. Jackson 9 illustrates this three-factor analysis.
A white sold his home to a black. Other whites sued the
seller for breach of a restrictive covenant. The seller defended by asserting the equal protection rights of the black purchaser. The Court held that the assertion of third-party rights
was permissible, mentioning all three factors. First, there was
a relation between the party and the third party, namely
seller and buyer. Second, it would be "difficult if not impossible"9" for the black purchaser to assert his rights. Third,
the prudential rule against vicarious standing was "outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental
rights . ...""

It is not necessary to show that all three factors are present in order to invoke this exception to the rule against
vicarious standing, but the more the merrier. Cases stressing
the relationship between the party and the third party in86. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
87. Wanh, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
88. G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 1574.
89. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
90. Id. at 257.
91. Id.
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clude those involving the standing of associations to represent their members,9 2 the standing of doctors to represent
their patients," next-friend standing,9 4 and the shareholder
standing rule.9 5 Cases stressing the "impossibility" factor include Singleton v. Wulff,96 in which the majority suggested
that claimant need not prove that it is actually impossible for
the third party to assert the right but only that the third
party confronts "some genuine obstacle.""
(2)

First Amendment Overbreadth

A second exception to the rule against vicarious standing
is that free speech claimants challenging a substantially
overbroad statute are permitted to assert the rights of third
parties not before the court. Thus, if a statute could constitutionally be applied to the claimant but the language of the
statute is capable of being applied unconstitutionally to a
substantial number of others, claimant may assert the rights
of those other persons and have the statute struck down on
its face. 8 Thus, United States v. Robel 9° struck down a statute making it a crime for any member of a communist-action
organization to "engage in any employment in any defense
facility," because the language of the statute applied to members who were not active, did not know of the group's illegal
aims, and had no specific intent to further those illegal
aims.' 0 0
The reason for allowing third-party standing in this context is that overbroad statutes may chill the exercise of free
speech by third parties who are not willing to risk prosecu-

92. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See infra note 114 and
accompanying text.
93. E.g. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
94. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
95. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
96. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
97. Id. at 116. The four dissenters argued that claimant should be required
to show impossibility rather than merely some obstacle.
98. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601 (1973).
99. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
100. Cf Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which held that membership in the Communist Party may only be punished when the membership is
active, knowing, and with specific intent to further the Party's illegal aims.
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tion. Challenges by persons whose activities are not protected
are needed to eliminate the statute's chilling effect on persons whose activities are protected.
The foregoing rules concern standing in traditional private actions. The next section discusses the separate set of
rules that govern so-called taxpayer suits.
2.

Taxpayer Standing

Cases involving claimants who assert standing by virtue
of their status as taxpayers must be divided into those involving federal and state taxpayers and those involving local taxpayers. As a general rule, federal and state taxpayers do not
have standing, but there are exceptions. Local taxpayers are
more likely to have standing than federal and state taxpayers.
a. Federal Taxpayer Standing
1) General Rule: No Taxpayer Standing
As a general rule, individuals do not have standing solely
by virtue of their status as federal taxpayers to challenge
allegedly unconstitutional conduct by officers of the federal
government. The leading case on this point is Frothingham v.
Mellon, 0 1 which held that a federal taxpayer did not have
standing to raise a tenth amendment challenge to expenditures by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Maternity Act of 1921. This rule was confirmed by Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State,10 2 where the Court stated, "Following the decision in Frothingham, the Court confirmed that the expenditure of public funds in an allegedly unconstitutional manner
is not an injury sufficient to confer standing, even though
the plaintiff contributes to the public coffers as a taxpayer."'0 3 Reasons for this rule include the minute financial
interest of the individual taxpayer in any particular federal
expenditure, the unlikelihood that enjoining a federal expenditure will result in any reduction of tax liability, and the
generalized nature of the taxpayer's grievance.' °4

101.
102.
103.
104.

262 U.S. 447 (1923).
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Id. at 477.
"His [the federal taxpayer's] interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . .
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Exception: The Flast Double-Nexus Test

Flast v. Cohen °5 established an exception to the general
rule that federal taxpayers do not have standing to challenge
unconstitutional federal conduct. The Flast exception has two
requirements: 1) the challenged action must be a congressional exercise of the taxing-spending power and 2) the constitutional limit invoked must be an express limit on the
taxing-spending power.'0 6 The Court has made it quite
exception is to be kept within carefully
clear that the Flast
07
bounds.'
confined
The first case that demonstrated the Court's intent to
confine Flast was United States v. Richardson,'0 8 which held
that federal taxpayers have no standing to sue for an injunction requiring publication of CIA expenditures pursuant to
the expenditures clause.'0 9 As Justice Powell pointed out in
his concurring opinion, both prongs of the Flast test were
arguably met: the government's refusal to publish CIA expenditures was closely related to the spending power and the
publication requirement could certainly be viewed as a limit
on the spending power. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's

is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and
the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive
powers of a court of equity." Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
105. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
106. This two-prong test was conceptualized as a "double-nexus" test. The first
prong required "a logical link between that [taxpayer] status and the type of
legislative enactment attacked." Id. at 102. To establish that link, the government
action challenged by the taxpayer must involve an exercise of the taxing power.
The second prong required "a nexus between that status and the precise nature
of the constitutional infringement alleged." Id. To establish that link, the constitutional provision invoked must be a limit on the taxing power. This conceptualization is no longer especially important, as long as one applies the two-prong
requirement of 1) congressional exercise of the taxing power and 2) constitutional
limit on the taxing power.
107. As the Court put it in Valley Foge Christian College, "Any doubt that once
might have existed concerning the rigor with which the Flast exception to the
Frothingham principle ought to be applied should have been erased by this Court's
recent decisions . . . ." 454 U.S. at 481.

108. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The clause provides, "a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time."
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opinion for the five-vote majority held that neither of the
required connections was present.
Valley Forge Christian College"' is the case that most
clearly reveals the Court's determination to restrict the Flast
exception. The federal government gave the college 77 acres
of land with a hospital on it. The value of the land was $1.3
million. Federal taxpayers challenged the gift under the establishment clause. The gift was made pursuant to a federal
statute and it certainly involved valuable property purchased
by taxes, so the first nexus seemed present. Flast had already
held that the establishment clause is a limit on the taxing
and spending powers, so the second nexus was plainly present. Yet the Court held that the taxpayers did not have
standing. The first nexus was not present, according to Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, because the gift was made
by an executive agency rather than Congress and the gift was
made pursuant to the property power rather than the taxing
and spending powers.
b.

State and Local Taxpayer Standing

The rule against federal taxpayer standing applies to
state taxpayers as well,"' but it does not apply to suits by
taxpayers of local government. While the interests of federal
and state taxpayers are minute, indeterminable, and remote," 2 "The interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in
the application of its moneys is direct and immediate and
the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate."" 3
3.

OrganizationalStanding

The requirements for organizational standing - that is,
the standing of an organization to represent its members are three-fold." 4 First, the organization's members must
have standing in their own right. Second, the interests at

110. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
111. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (1989); Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
113. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
114. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 855 (1988); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
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stake must be germane to the organization's purpose. Third,
the participation of individual members must not be necessary.
III.

CONCLUSION

The justiciability requirement is a fundamental and critically important preliminary requirement in American constitutional law. Justiciability rules must be satisfied in every
constitutional case and indeed in every nonconstitutional case
as well. If even a single requirement is not met, the court
should dismiss the claim without reaching the merits.
Justiciability law presents the law student and lawyer with
a complex and formidable set of interrelated requirements
concerning the what, the when, and the who of constitutional litigation. The problem is compounded by the courts' tendency to apply the rules in an inconsistent, ad hoc, resultoriented manner. Courts often loosen the requirements when
they want to decide the merits of a controversy and tighten
the requirements when they want to duck a case. Decisions
concerning justiciability - including those of the Supreme
Court - are therefore often unprincipled and irreconcilable.
Nevertheless it is possible to set forth a structural analysis of justiciability requirements and articulate the formal
tests for at least some of these requirements. This article has
attempted to present a coherent outline of justiciability law.
Hopefully it will help law students, lawyers, and perhaps even
judges perform justiciability analyses in an orderly manner.
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APPENDIX

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to
set forth the following, more detailed outline of basic justiciability analysis.
Justiciability: Basic Analysis
A. The What
1. The actual case requirement
a. The adversity requirement and the rule against
collusive cases
b. The rule against advisory opinions
2. The justiciable issue requirement
a. The political question doctrine
1) Demonstrable textual commitment,
2) Not apt for judicial resolution, or
3) Too hot to handle
b. The rule against extrajudicial review
B. The When
1. Ripeness
2. Mootness
a. General rule: if moot, must dismiss
b. Exceptions
1) Capable of repetition yet evading review,
2) Class actions, or
3) Voluntary cessation by respondent
3. The rule of necessity
C. The Who (Standing)
1. General standing
a. Constitutional requirements
1) Injury in fact and
2) Nexus
a) Causation and
b) Redressability
b. Prudential requirements
1) More than a generalized grievance and
2) No vicarious standing
a) General rule: claimant may not assert
the rights of third parties
b) Exceptions
(1) One or more of the following
factors present:
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(a) Relationship between claimant
and third party
(b) Substantial obstacle that prevents third party from asserting right
(c) Risk of diluting third party's
rights, or
(2) First amendment overbreadth
Taxpayer standing
a. Federal taxpayers
1) General rule: no federal taxpayer standing
2) Exception (Flast double-nexus test)
a) Congressional exercise of taxing and
spending power
(1) Exercise of taxing and spending
power
(2) By Congress and
b) Constitutional limit on taxing and
spending power
b. State taxpayers
General rule: no state taxpayer standing
c. Local taxpayers
Local taxpayers may have standing if they have
have sufficient actual injury
Organizational standing, only if:
a. Members have standing in their own right,
b. The claim is germane to the organization's interests, and
c. Participation by individual members is not required.

